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While the term ‘labour hire’ is of relatively recent origin in Australia, the use of 
agencies or companies specialising in the supply and provision of workers to 
client companies and organisations dates back to at least the 1950s. The 
contemporary form of the labour hire industry in Australia can be 
comprehended as the result of at least three particular antecedents: 
 
1. The traditional agency employment industry. ‘Temping agencies’ have long 
specialised in the provision of workers to help client companies cope with 
fluctuations in demand or the temporary absence of employees. Generally 
these agencies first emerged in order to provide clerical, administrative and 
other white collar support staff – staff who could normally walk into 
organisations with standard secretarial and administrative skills. Many of 
these firms have flourished in recent years and many have expanded the 
range of staff they can provide well beyond the original office temps that 
dominated ‘labour hire’ prior to the 1990s. Contemporary examples of these 
firms include Drake Personnel, Hays Metier and Kelly Services. 
 
2. The recruitment industry. With the increasing propensity to outsource 
aspects of HR functions in the 1970s and 1980s, many firms looked to 
specialist recruitment companies to provide shortlists of suitable candidates. 
With the growth in the demand for labour hire, recruitment firms found it 
relatively easy to offer clients short term or longer term placements whereby 
the worker worked at the client’s premises but their wage was paid by the 
recruitment firm. In this way, recruitment firms are able to offer their clients 
an alternative to a permanent placement. Client firms can effectively trial a 
prospective employee as a labour hire placement and decide subsequently to 
engage them as a direct employee for the payment of a one-off fee to the 
recruitment- labour hire company.  
 
3. The ‘pure’ labour hire industry. In the late 1980s a number of small 
specialist firms began to offer contract labour as a replacement for or 
supplement to existing employees for companies in a number of highly 
unionised and dispute-prone industries such as building and construction 
and shearing. In the 1991 case, Building Workers Industrial Union & Ors v 
Odco Pty Ltd1. the full court of the Federal Court upheld an earlier decision 
that the workers supplied by the labour hire company Troubleshooters 
Available were not employees of either the host company nor the labour 
hire firm but were, in fact, contractors (Fenwick 1992). This meant that 
neither Troubleshooters nor their contractors were bound by the prevailing 
building industry awards. The decision cleared the way for labour hire 
companies to provide contract staff to clients at highly competitive rates – 
paying the contractors below award rates and thereby being able to offer 
clients a competitive labour supply contract while still generating a profit.  
 
The contemporary industry in Australia also features a number of very large, 
high profile international labour hire, or ‘flexible labour’ firms that have moved 
in over the top of the domestic operators, on occasion acquiring ownership and 
control of those companies. Adecco and Manpower are amongst the largest 
labour hire operators in Australia. Those operators have spread their supply of 
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labour across the entire labour market while other big established players such 
as Skilled Engineering retain more specialised operations. In 2000 it was 
estimated that Adecco had revenues in Australia of over $700 million which 
were anticipated to top $1 billion within two years. At that time, Asia Pacific 
CEO Ray Roe argued that the ‘explosion in the use of flexible workforce’ was 
set to continue (Workplace Express 19 July 2000). The peak industry body 
representing the labour hire industry, the Recruitment and Contract Services 
Association, conducted a 1999 survey indicating that the industry generates 
around $10 billion in annual sales in Australia (DIR 2001: 18).  
 
The growth in labour hire in Australia over the past decade has been one of the 
most dramatic aspects of the more general proliferation of non-standard 
employment. While considerable Australian and overseas research effort has 
been devoted to the explanation of the growth in non-standard employment 
relatively little is known about the reasons for the growth in the particular forms 
of labour hire that have come to prominence in Australia. Relying on anecdotal, 
case study and survey evidence this chapter attempts to explore some of the key 
stimulants of the labour hire industry in Australia by examining the range of 
employer motivations that appear to drive what is fundamentally a demand-side 
phenomenon. On the basis of this analysis and assessment, the chapter then 
considers the future prospects for the industry in terms of emerging policy 
responses.  
 
What is Labour Hire and What is the Problem? 
 
Labour hire can be defined as an arrangement whereby ‘a labour hire company 
or agency provides individual workers to a client or host with the labour hire 
company being ultimately responsible for the worker’s remuneration’ (ACTU 
2000: 2; see also Hall 2000: 26). The essential quality of a labour hire 
arrangement is the splitting of contractual and control relationships: the worker 
works at the site and under the practical day-to-day direction of the host or 
client organisation; the worker is paid by the labour hire firm and has a direct 
(contractual or employment) relationship with them; the client firm pays a 
contract fee to the labour hire firm for the provision of that labour and thus also 
has a contractual relationship with the labour hire firm.  
 
While these relationships might appear to be relatively straightforward in 
theory they can become complicated in practice. First, there is typically a 
control relationship but not a contractual relationship between the worker and 
the client or host company. In a labour law context predicated on the assumed 
existence of a bipartite employment relationship between employer and 
employee the law has struggled to establish where liabilities should rest in some 
labour hire cases. Second, the character of the legal relationship between the 
worker and the labour hire firm may not always be clear. For example, while 
some labour hire workers might be employees of the labour hire firm, labour 
hire firms often describe their workers as ‘associates’ or ‘contractors’ and seek 
to construct them as contractors rather than employees. Third, the extent to 
which the worker is working under the control and direction of the host 
company or the labour hire company might be disputed. The issue can be 
critical for ascribing responsibility for occupational health and safety. In some 
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cases, labour hire companies suggest that they assume at least partial 
responsibility for their worker’s OH&S by claiming that they refuse to send 
staff to a site unless they have first established the safety of the site2. Liability 
for OH&S has been attributed to labour hire companies in at least some cases 
(WorkCover (Inspector James Swee Ch’Ng) v Drake Personnel3; DIR 2001: 
62)). In other cases the WorkCover authority of NSW has argued that the host 
employer bears OH&S responsibilities under the relevant Act (DIR 2001: 56).  
 
The complicated legal character of labour hire arrangements in practice is 
therefore problematic for ascertaining liability in a number of instances – where 
there has been a breach of OH&S regulations, where a labour hire worker is 
injured and neither client company nor labour hire company is prepared to 
assume responsibility for rehabilitation and return to work, and, in unfair 
dismissal cases where both client and labour hire firm might seek to deny that 
the aggrieved worker is their employee.  
 
However labour hire is also problematic for individual workers and labour 
markets more generally. The labour market problems associated with labour 
hire employment arrangements can be summarised under three inter-related 
themes: 
 
1. Labour hire workers tend to be engaged as either casual employees or 
dependent contractors. The employment conditions tend to be characterised 
by insecurity, precariousness, the absence of career paths, low or below 
award pay and substandard conditions. 
 
Amongst the ranks of labour hire employees (as distinct from contractors) 
casual rather than permanent employment is the overwhelming form of 
employment. For example, the AiG survey estimates that almost 97% of labour 
hire workers are engaged as ‘casuals’ (AiG 2000: 4). While some labour hire 
workers are on long term contracts, (for example the ACTU has estimated that 
over 10% of labour hire workers have been with the one client for over 2 years 
(ACTU 2000: 1)) the RCSA has estimated that the average length of labour hire 
assignment is six weeks. The essence of labour hire employment conditions is 
that continuity of engagement, let alone employment, is not guaranteed. 
 
Low pay and under award pay appears to be common in the labour hire 
industry. Union submissions to the NSW Labour Hire Task Force document 
many instances of labour hire firms paying below site rates, below prevailing 
industry standards and, on some occasions, paying significantly below award 
base rates. For example, the FSU notes that casual labour hire staff in the 
operations sections and call centres of the banking industry are paid between $1 
and $3 per hour less than permanent bank employees performing the same work 
(DIR 2001: 30). The secretary of the Queensland Council of Unions has also 
claimed that under-payment of labour hire workers is common in that state: she 
has estimated, for example,  that only 10 of 90 labour hire companies operating 
in the construction industry in Queensland pay their employees at or above 
award rates (Workplace Express 25 April 2001).  
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The incentive to pay low is a structural feature of the labour hire industry. 
Where a labour hire employer can be compelled to pay award rates it appears 
that market forces ensure that they are soon undercut by a competing operator 
who is prepared to avoid paying the award rate. For example, the FCU notes a 
case involving data entry operators engaged by labour hire giant MPM 
Personnel. Under union pressure to pay the award rate, MPM adjusted their 
tender price for a major client only to lose the tender to a competitor agency 
which paid its workers an estimated $4 per hour below the award rate (FCU 
2000).  
 
Qantas uses labour hire staff amongst its long haul international flight 
attendants based outside Australia. Adecco employs the flight attendants based 
in Auckland and Bangkok and these workers are not covered by the Enterprise 
Bargaining Agreement (EBA) that applies to Australian based Qantas flight 
attendants. Evidently Qantas is keen to extend the practice of employing more 
flight attendant staff off-shore through labour hire so as to avoid the EBA 
conditions enjoyed by its Australian based staff. Announcing the company’s 
plans to launch a new budget international airline, Qantas Chief Executive, 
Geoff Dixon, appealed to unions to ‘accept the realities’ and noted that 94% of 
Qantas staff were employed in Australia under ‘premium conditions’ 
(Workplace Express 15 June 2001). Dixon argued that ‘We need to get rid of 
very outmoded labour practices’ and that ‘we cannot compete if 94% of our 
people continue to be employed under these conditions. We need other 
opportunities to reduce our costs by employing more people overseas’ 
(Financial Times, 15 June 2001).  
 
2. Labour hire employment tends to be associated with limited training and 
skills development.  
 
Arguments and evidence concerning the links between labour hire employment 
and training and human resource development have been documented and 
developed elsewhere (Hall 2000; Hall, Bretherton and Buchanan 2000). The 
overwhelming body of evidence suggests that labour hire workers receive less 
training and much less portable training and skills development than permanent 
employees (ACTU 2000: 6-7; DIR 2000: 26; Lafferty and Roan 1999). The 
labour hire training deficit is not only disadvantageous for individual workers 
who are either not receiving training or are forced to fully shoulder the burden 
of accessing, undertaking and paying for training themselves. The explosion of 
labour hire, particularly in highly skilled areas such as manufacturing 
maintenance, has also led to a serious depletion in the skills available in the 
labour market (Marshman 1998: 27; Hall et al 2000).  
 
3. Labour hire employment is often associated with limited industrial 
protection afforded by awards, enterprise bargaining arrangements and 
union coverage.  
 
Labour hire workers are inherently difficult for unions to organise for a number 
of reasons. First, labour workers often have relatively itinerant work histories 
and non-standard work patterns. This makes it difficult for unions to identify 
and approach potential members and to identify likely breaches of award or 
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other industrial conditions. Second, labour hire workers are rarely prepared to 
speak out against employer breaches of award or statutory conditions because 
of their general vulnerability and dependency on their labour hire employer for 
future assignments. These realities greatly affect the enforceability of any 
conditions and protections even where they have been won.  
 
The case studies presented to the NSW Task Force by one of Australia’s major 
unions, the Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union (AMWU), reveal a 
litany of breaches of award conditions: failure to pay site rates to labour hire 
workers where this is a condition of the EBA; failure to pay according to the 
appropriate award classification; and failing to pay casual loadings (DIR 2001: 
33-34). The Finance Sector Union (FSU) reports similar cases in the banking 
and finance industries. That union has claimed that all but one of the major 
labour hire companies it deals with have failed to abide by the promises they 
have made to the ACTU to pay appropriate rates and respect negotiated 
conditions (FSU 2000).  
 
Even where an award or registered industrial arrangement is in place, unions 
report persistent difficulties in ensuring that the instrument can be updated to 
ensure that labour hire workers’ entitlements keep pace with prevailing 
standards. For example, the Federated Clerks’ Union notes that the award 
covering labour hire workers in the clerical industry, the Clerical and 
Administrative Employees in Temporary Employment Services (State) Award, 
contains only four grades while the main clerical and administrative award 
contains five. The FCU (2000) claims that the RCSA has not consented to the 
inclusion of the extra grade and that it is unable to mount an arbitration hearing 
because no labour hire worker is prepared to come forward and give evidence 
before the Commission for fear of labour hire reprisal. The union has also 
claimed that the labour hire companies routinely pay their workers at the lowest 
grade possible, often significantly lower than that being received by permanent 
employees undertaking the same work alongside them (FCU 2000).  
 
The operation of labour hire employment arrangements in Australia has become 
problematic for legal, industrial, skills development and employee protection 
reasons. Possible and proposed policy responses to the specific problems 
identified are considered in the final section. However, the more general 
desirability of labour hire employment arrangements should also be questioned.  
 
The problem with labour hire in the contemporary Australian labour market is 
not its existence per se – it has, after all existed in one form or another for at 
least 50 years – but rather in its proliferation as an alternative form of 
employment. Depending on definition and data source the number of labour 
hire workers ranges between 84,300 (ABS Forms of Employment Survey 
reporting the number of employees paid by an employment agency in 1998) to 
about 280,000 (ABS Employment Services Survey reporting the number of 
people ‘on-hired’ by one business in the employment services industry to 
another business). Regardless of the exact number of labour hire workers, it is 
apparent that they constitute a large and growing proportion of the labour 
market.  
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As the examples of Qantas, the Commonwealth Bank and a large number of 
employers in a wide range of industries including transport, retail and 
manufacturing suggests the problematic aspect of labour hire is where it is seen 
as an alternative employment arrangement to permanent full-time or part-time 
or even regulated casual employment. As the above examples illustrate, labour 
hire has grown in Australia partly because it offers some employers the 
opportunity to lower labour costs by substituting labour hire workers for in-
house, direct employees. If this is a prime motivation, and if the consequence is 
substandard pay and conditions and inadequate protections for workers, then 
quite dramatic policy action is probably in order. However, lower labour costs 
might not be the major motivation for employers using labour hire and the 
union evidence referred to above might be misrepresenting the real 
circumstance for most labour hire workers and clients. In order to investigate in 
greater depth the extent and character of the labour hire problem, the evidence 
concerning employer motivations for choosing labour hire is considered.  
 
Employer Motivations for Labour Hire 
 
It has previously been suggested (Hall 2000: 30) that the motivations for 
employers’ choosing labour hire include: 
 
 Capacity outsourcing – using labour hire to cope with peaks and troughs in 
demand. 
 
 Specialisation subcontracting – using labour hire to provide the specialist 
skills from time to time. 
 
 Cost reduction – using labour hire even at the premium contract price 
demanded by a labour hire company so as to save on on-costs, overheads 
and liabilities 
 
 Contract out industrial relations problems – using labour hire workers as a 
substitute for an existing workforce that management might regard as 
problematic because of industrial disputation, poor performance or union 
presence.  
 
 Stimulate organisational change – using or threatening to use labour hire 
staff as part of a fundamental change to work organisation and, potentially 
workplace culture.  
 
On the basis of the submissions received from labour hire companies, unions 
and others the NSW Task Force (DIR 2001: 15-17) identified the following 
employer motivations: 
 
Flexibility – identified as the biggest motivation, flexibility was consistently 
mentioned by labour hire operators as being the major motivation for clients 
using their services. This conception of flexibility corresponds with capacity 
outsourcing and specialisation subcontracting as defined above. Most of the 
examples of flexibility imperatives noted by the Task Force (DIR 2001: 15) 
suggested the short term engagement of a relatively small number of labour hire 
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workers to cover for absences, meet peaks in demand or access specialist skills 
that might be needed from time to time. Only one example – using the 
arrangement to assess a potential employee’s performance – suggested a longer 
term engagement.  
 
Risk Management – many employers use labour hire as a way of minimising 
their risks. For example, businesses can use labour hire as a way of enhancing 
their capacity to ‘hire and fire’ without exposing themselves to the risk of an 
unfair dismissal claim (but see: Misheva v Spicers Paper Ltd.4). Typically, if 
the client does not like the worker sent to their workplace they can simply call 
the labour hire firm and request another worker, or simply try another labour 
hire company. Naturally many employers see this as more convenient than 
attempting a dismissal.  
 
Cost Factors – the Task Force noted union claims and evidence that some 
businesses can avoid, or at least reduce, the obligations they have to workers 
through the use of labour hire and that some labour hire operators undercut 
prevailing standards in order to offer clients competitive prices.  
 
The report also noted a number of other motivations including the reduction of 
on-costs or administrative costs and the motivation of using labour hire to 
reduce union presence, institute new forms of consultation and negotiation and 
substitute the existing workforce with a more compliant and more affordable 
workforce.  
 
Some recent survey data assists in clarifying the relative intensity of various 
possible motivations amongst employers for seeking labour hire. In late 1999 
approximately 400 employer members of Australian Business Limited were 
surveyed on a range of matters including their use of outsourcing and labour 
hire. The survey revealed that the use of labour hire was relatively common. 
Almost one-third (32.8%) of all companies surveyed used at least some labour 
hire staff. Moreover, the extent of usage was relatively large for a significant 
proportion of companies – Almost half (45.6%) of the firms using at least some 
labour hire reported that at least 10% of their total staff were labour hire 
workers.  
 
Respondents to the survey were asked to consider their use of outsourcing, 
labour hire and the use of contractors. They were then asked about a range of 
possible advantages and disadvantages of outsourcing. While respondents were 
not asked to distinguish between outsourcing, labour hire and use of contractors 
it is known that labour hire and outsourcing are closely related and it is likely 
that the motivations for ‘outsourcing’ are similar to the motivations for ‘labour 
hire’. Table 1 shows the proportion of companies which regard particular 
features of outsourcing as an advantage and also shows respondent employer’s 
estimation of the most significant advantage of outsourcing.  
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Table 1: Employer Assessments of the Advantages of Outsourcing  
 
 % nominating as an 
advantage 
% nominating as the 
most significant 
advantage 
Cost effectiveness 54.6 36.9 
Flexibility in meeting 
fluctuations in demand 
 
48.0 
 
30.0 
Increased range of skills 31.8 10.5 
Quality of production/ service 24.2 6.4 
Capacity to solve site specific 
problems 
 
25.4 
 
5.2 
Capacity to change supplier 29.8 4.2 
Control over labour 17.7 4.1 
Lower union influence 8.3 0.6 
Other 2.3 2.3 
Total  100.0 
 
Source: Australian Business Limited - ACIRRT Survey 1999.  
 
It must be recalled that respondents were here encouraged to think about all the 
‘outsourcing’ type strategies they use - strict outsourcing and ‘turnkey project 
management’ right through to the occasional use of individual labour hire 
workers. Therefore these results should be interpreted with some caution in 
reaching conclusions about the motivations for labour hire as distinct from 
outsourcing. Nevertheless, the data appear to confirm that cost effectiveness is a 
very important consideration and perceived advantage for many employers. 
While cost effectiveness was seen as the single most important advantage of 
those offered, flexibility in coping with peaks and troughs in demand and 
access to a greater range of skills might together be taken to constitute the 
flexibility motivation; and over 40% mentioned one or other of these 
advantages as the most significant. As might be expected control is not seen to 
be an advantage of outsourcing. Interestingly, very few respondents identified 
lessening of union influence as an advantage to outsourcing.  
 
All the available evidence suggests that cost and flexibility are the two major 
motivations for employers’ use of labour hire. The analysis and interpretation 
presented above suggests that both aspects of the use of labour hire presents 
potential difficulties for the labour market experiences of workers working in 
labour hire.  
 
Employers’ desire for flexible access to workers and their skills when they are 
needed is, of course, nothing new. Indeed flexibility has probably constituted 
the single most prominent imperative of labour market transformation in 
Australia (and the industrialised world) over the past fifteen years. While there 
is a case for minimising the proliferation of jobs that are flexible (at the call of 
the employer rather than the employee) it might be possible to achieve 
significant improvement to the vulnerability, exposure and disadvantage for 
many workers through regulation of flexible labour and protection of the 
conditions for those flexible labour hire workers.  
 
Richard Hall: Labour Hire in Australia 
 11
The use of labour hire for largely cost reasons is likely to be more pernicious. It 
is likely that where employers are largely motivated by cost considerations, 
they will be determined to seek labour hire companies that can supply labour at 
the lowest cost. The predisposition of companies (as purchasers of labour from 
labour hire companies) to seek the lowest labour supply rates will encourage 
labour hire firms to undercut each other’s rates. As the anecdotal examples 
brought to the attention of the NSW Task Force have indicated, this will often 
encourage at least the more opportunistic operators to pay workers at below 
award or below market rates, and seek to minimise the provision of adequate 
conditions of employment and appropriate protection of workers through 
workers compensation payments and the protection of entitlements.  
 
 To summarise, the dynamics of the labour hire industry in Australia appears to 
conceal a number of problems that warrant the attention of policy makers. First, 
the issue of where legal liabilities rest is not always clear in practice when 
questions of OH&S, rehabilitation and return to work after injury, and unfair 
dismissal arise. Second, in many cases labour hire workers appear to be lowly 
paid, or paid less than prevailing award or EBA standards or less than 
permanent workers performing the same work in the same firm. They are also 
more likely to have poorer conditions than permanent workers. Third, labour 
hire workers appear to have access to less employer funded training and the 
proliferation of labour hire may have had deleterious consequences for the 
skills profile of some industries and labour markets. Fourth, labour hire workers 
appear to have less secure industrial regulation and protection than other in-
house workers.  
 
In the course of this survey it has also been noted that at least some employers 
have sought to use labour hire as a mechanism for substituting existing 
permanent workers with less expensive, more flexible and more compliant 
labour hire workers. In other cases labour hire firms have been used in an 
attempt to either avoid legislative or industrial obligations or to make 
employees redundant by changing the legal identity of their employer to a 
labour hire firm that is either not party to an existing industrial instrument (the 
Tripac model5) or is bankrupt (the Patrick’s model6).  
 
The evidence on employer motivations would suggest that employers are often 
seeking improved flexibility in the use of labour hire labour. It has been argued 
that in the interests of the protection of the interests of workers the conditions 
of flexible employment need to be strongly regulated and effectively protected. 
The other major motivating force pushing the growth of labour hire appears to 
be cost reductions. It has been argued that low cost labour hire must be 
significantly curtailed so that the proliferation of low cost, low paid 
employment under the guise of labour hire is minimised.  
 
Responses and Prospects 
 
The regulation of temporary agency work in Europe 
 
Since the early 1980s the European Commission has struggled to develop a 
Directive on the European equivalent of labour hire, temporary agency work 
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(TAW). After a couple of failed attempts, a lengthy period of consultation on an 
number of matters relating to TAW, part-time work and fixed-term contract 
work commenced in 1995 under the social policy agreement associated with the 
Maastricht Treaty. The social partners were able to agree on policies for part-
time work and fixed term contracts, but no agreement was able to be reached on 
TAW. Talks on a TAW Directive broke down in May 2001. The major 
‘stumbling block’ in the negotiations concerned the definition and conception 
of a ‘comparable worker’ for the purposes of trying to guarantee that TAW 
workers should be entitled to equal pay and conditions with ‘comparable 
workers’. While the ETUC has argued that the benchmark should be 
comparable workers in the same (host) organisation, the employers have 
rejected this proposal on the basis that in some member states TAW workers 
continue to be paid even when they are between assignments and cannot, 
therefore, be compared to in-house workers (Euronline 2001a).  
 
Despite the impasse, the Commission has continued to work towards draft EU 
legislation. In October 2001 the representatives of the social partners, Euro-
CIETT (the European committee of the International Confederation of 
Temporary Work Businesses) and UNI-Europa (the European regional 
organisation of the Union Network International), reached agreement on a Joint 
Declaration on Temporary Agency Work. The Declaration specifies 13 
objectives which the social partners believe should be addressed in the 
proposed EU Directive. Amongst other things the objectives include: 
 
 The recognition that non-agency work and on-going contracts of 
employment should continue to be the most commonly used forms of 
employment, while recognising that agency work can still make a 
contribution to the EU’s employment and economic objectives; 
 
 Recognition of the principle of equal treatment both with respect to 
relationships between agencies and workers and host companies and 
workers; 
 
 Acceptance that certain restrictions, prohibitions and regulations may be 
required to prevent potential abuses of the use of TAW so that the 
conditions of work of workers in non-agency employment are not 
undermined; 
 
 Ensuring that TAW is not used to replace striking workers; 
 
 Recognising that agencies have the legal obligations of an employer toward 
their TAW workers 
 
 Ensuring that agency workers have access to appropriate training and 
development opportunities, both in the agency and in the host company; 
 
 Developing innovative solutions to ensure that occupational benefits (such 
as pensions) continue to accrue for TAW workers. (Eironline 2001b) 
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Individual member states of the EU presently regulate TAW through a 
combination of legislative provisions and collective bargaining. Most countries 
have relatively extensive legislative regimes covering TAW directly or 
indirectly – Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Spain – while a minority have limited or no 
regulation – Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Sweden and the UK. For those 
‘high regulation countries’, laws typically cover matters including: specifying 
the permissible length of TAW contracts; restricting the purposes for which 
TAW workers may be engaged; guaranteeing TAW workers parity with other 
comparable workers in terms of pay and conditions of employment; and, 
ensuring TAW worker’s rights to union membership and representation 
(Eirobserver 2000). 
 
Where there are legislative restrictions on the use of TAW these typically 
identify permissible purposes as including: temporary replacement of absent 
employees or in the interim prior to a new permanent engagement, the 
performance of a special, fixed term task or role or for the performance of 
inherently temporary or seasonal work. Eight countries (Austria, Belgium, 
France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) have laws 
guaranteeing that TAW workers enjoy the same pay and conditions as similar 
permanent employees working in the same host organisation. In some other 
countries, such as Denmark, parity with comparable employees in the host 
organisation is secured through collective agreements in at least some sectors 
(Eirobserver 2000).  
 
As the difficulties over negotiations between the social partners as to the 
definition of comparable workers attests, the detail of regulation at the EU-level 
is still the subject of dispute. Nevertheless, many states have adopted a 
relatively strong regulatory approach, seeking to restrict TAW to genuine cases 
of employer need for temporary workers as a supplement to, rather than a 
replacement for, the existing permanent workforce. The industry partners’ joint 
declaration of October 2001 also suggests a shared commitment to restrict 
TAW to temporary labour needs.  
 
Collective bargaining has certainly been relevant to the regulation of TAW, 
both in the ‘high regulation’ states and the ‘low regulation’ states, however, on 
balance, legislation rather than collective bargaining has led the way.  
 
The regulation of labour hire in Australia: the case of New South Wales 
 
Compared to Europe most Australian jurisdictions have been slow to move 
toward comprehensive regulation of labour hire. Queensland and Victoria now 
have the most detailed set of legislative regulations. In Queensland and 
Victoria, the definitions of employer and employee in the relevant state 
industrial relations acts specifically include labour hire companies and labour 
hire workers. Contractors can be deemed ‘employees’ by the Industrial 
Relations Commission (in Queensland) or by the Fair Employment Tribunal (in 
Victoria). Most states also have systems requiring the licensing of ‘employment 
agents’, however, with the exception of the ACT, the definition of employment 
agents do not normally include labour hire companies. No Australian 
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jurisdiction currently has legislation that purports to regulate the length of 
labour hire contracts, the purposes for which labour hire may or may not be 
engaged, or establishes the parity of labour hire workers with other comparable 
workers in host organisations.  
 
NSW Labour Hire Task Force 
 
In May 2000 the NSW Attorney General and Minister for Industrial Relations 
established a Task Force to inquire into and make recommendations about the 
labour hire industry in NSW. The report (DIR 2000), completed early in 2001, 
was finally released in December 2001. The Report of the Task Force makes a 
number of recommendations concerning reforms to better regulate the labour 
hire industry in NSW. The principal recommendations can be summarised: 
 
Expand the definition of employer to include labour hire companies. 
 
This recommendation will assist in broadening the range of workers who will 
be afforded protection under  the NSW Industrial Relations Act. Nevertheless, 
the definition of labour hire company is restricted to circumstances where the 
worker has a contract of service with the company – this would appear to 
exclude contractors who would be argued to have a contract for service with the 
labour hire company.  
 
Establish a licensing regime for labour hire companies. 
 
The licensing of labour hire operators provides an opportunity for the state to 
develop a regulatory approach to the industry. The Report recommends the 
establishment of a working party to work out the detail of the licensing process, 
however the report recommends that licensing be based on companies 
demonstrating that they meet statutory requirements regarding appropriate 
insurance, payment of workers compensation premiums, superannuation, 
payroll tax and entitlements under applicable industrial instruments. Such a 
regime would appear to go a long way toward raising the barriers of entry to the 
industry and reducing the number of low cost operators in the industry.  
 
In its submission to the Task Force the AMWU referred to the introduction of 
training regulations in the labour hire industry in the food industry which led to 
the reduction in the total number of labour hire operators from twenty to thirty 
to just two or three. The Task Force report fell short of making any 
recommendation regarding the imposition of requirements for a certain amount 
of training to provided by labour hire operators however.  
 
The Department of Industrial Relations to conduct an education campaign on 
the rights and responsibilities of all parties to a labour hire arrangement.  
 
To the extent that labour hire operators or client organisations are actually 
ignorant of their responsibilities this recommendation may have some effect.  
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Amend the OH&S legislation such that both client organisations and labour 
hire companies are rendered jointly responsible for the OH&S of labour hire 
workers.  
 
This recommendation reflects the leading NSW authority of Ankucic v Drake 
Personnel t/as Drake Industrial7 where both Drake and the host employer were 
fined for each failing to ensure the health and safety of the labour hire worker. 
This recommendation was also supported by a further recommendation for an 
education campaign to increase the awareness of labour hire and host 
companies regarding their OH&S responsibilities.  
 
Amend the relevant legislation to mandate joint responsibility on both host 
organisation and labour hire company for rehabilitation and return to work of 
injured workers. 
 
The mandating of joint responsibility and the inclusion of WorkCover as the 
authority to determine the details of the implementation should ensure that 
injured labour hire workers stand a better chance of accessing improved 
rehabilitation and return to work opportunities. However, the practical problem 
remains that few labour hire companies will have the capacity to provide 
anything other than routine office work for injured employees.  
 
By and large the recommendations of the Task Force will assist in clarifying the 
legal liabilities and responsibilities of labour hire companies and client firms in 
the cases of OH&S regulatory and legislative breaches, and cases where 
rehabilitation and return to work becomes an issue. The first recommendation 
will also make it more difficult for labour hire companies to avoid the operation 
of relevant statutory obligations. Nevertheless, labour hire companies, seeking 
to avoid liability under the Industrial Relations Act will continue to argue that 
while they may be an employer the worker concerned was a contractor rather 
than an employee.  
 
The most important recommendation is likely to be the establishment of a 
licensing regime for the industry. The development of reasonably stringent 
standards and requirements for licensing will be likely to drive out many of the 
smaller, low cost operators that are generally thought to be responsible for 
undercutting the rates of those labour hire firms that claim to be paying 
appropriate wages and providing appropriate conditions. Despite the potential 
significance of this recommendation, if cost effectiveness or the pursuit of cost 
reductions continues to be a major motivation for employers, then employers 
will continue to seek the most competitive rate for labour hire labour. There is 
no reason, on the face of the recommendation, that licensed labour hire 
operators will not, over time, come to compete on pay rates alone, given that 
they will have little room to compete on overheads and on-costs.  
 
The Task Force also failed to make any recommendation that might address the 
employer-funded training deficit in labour hire and the limited industrial 
protection afforded labour hire workers. The Task Force report notes in passing 
some of the arguments concerning equity in the site rates paid to in-house 
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employees and labour hire workers, and transmission of business issues but it 
also failed to make any recommendations on these matters.  
 
A strong public policy case remains for addressing each of these issues. The 
establishment of a licensing regime and licensing fees holds the prospect of 
generating a pool of funds which might be able to be used to subsidise or 
provide training for labour hire workers as a means of overcoming the current 
training shortfall in labour hire. Other issues associated with the inferior pay 
and conditions often encountered by labour hire workers demand more creative 
and radical responses however. Consideration still needs to be given to means 
of enforcing labour hire companies to pay at least the equivalent hourly or daily 
rate as casual workers performing the same work at the same site. The lack of a 
career path for long term labour hire workers also requires the consideration of 
arrangements that will ensure the portability of entitlements across 
engagements. Again, the licensing of labour hire firms suggests a possible 
institutional form for the ‘banking’ of entitlements such as long service leave.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The labour hire industry likes to portray its business as the provision of flexible 
labour that can conveniently be brought in to workplaces to help employers 
cope with fluctuations in demand, a short term need for specialist skills, or the 
covering of staff absences. The reality, however, is that over the past ten years 
the labour hire industry in Australia has grown beyond this benevolent ‘temp 
employment agency’ model. The deliberate use of labour hire to drive down 
labour costs and even to substitute existing workforces with lower cost, more 
compliant workers, and the attempts by client employers to avoid or minimise 
their responsibilities and liabilities, has created an urgent need for policy 
reform. The problematic aspects of the labour hire industry may be tempered by 
reforms such as those recommended by the NSW Task Force, but most of them 
will persist until the key issue of pay rate and working conditions equivalence 
on work sites is finally addressed.  
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